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Device-independent quantum key distribution (DIQKD) is one of the most challenging tasks in
quantum cryptography. The protocols and their security are based on the existence of Bell inequal-
ities and the ability to violate them by measuring entangled states. We study the entanglement
needed for DIQKD protocols in two different ways. Our first contribution is the derivation of upper
bounds on the key rates of CHSH-based DIQKD protocols in terms of the violation of the inequality;
this sets an upper limit on the possible DI key extraction rate from states with a given violation.
Our upper bound improves on the previously known bound of Kaur et al. Our second contribution
is the initiation of the study of the role of bound entangled states in DIQKD. We present a revised
Peres conjecture stating that such states cannot be used as a resource for DIQKD. We give a first
piece of evidence for the conjecture by showing that the bound entangled state found by Vertesi
and Brunner, even though it can certify DI randomness, cannot be used to produce a key using
protocols analogous to the well-studied CHSH-based DIQKD protocol.
I. INTRODUCTION
The goal of a quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol is to allow two honest and cooperating
parties, named Alice and Bob, to create a shared key unknown to anyone but them. To this end they
hold a physical apparatus that, ideally, performs some measurements on quantum states, as defined
by the protocol. In practice, however, the devices may perform different operations, due to either
imperfections (such as noise in the quantum channels) or malicious intentions of the provider of the
devices who wishes to gain information about the shared key. Device-independent (DI) QKD protocols
address this problem; they achieve the strongest form of security of QKD protocols, with guarantees
that hold even when the physical devices used to implement the protocol are faulty or produced by an
untrusted manufacturer [1].
To achieve the required level of security while not relying on the inner-workings of the physical
devices, DI protocols are based on the violation of a Bell inequality [2, 3]. A Bell inequality [4] can
be viewed as a “non-local” game played between Alice and Bob. Alice and Bob each hold a device
in their own separated laboratories. The questions of the game are the inputs Alice and Bob give to
their devices (e.g., by pressing a button on the device): one question for Alice’s device, described as a
random variable X, and one for Bob’s device with random variable Y. Once the inputs are given, the
devices perform some (unknown) operation and return an output (displayed on a screen of the device,
for example). The outputs produced by the devices are the answers of the game, corresponding to a
random variable A for Alice and B for Bob. The game is won if the questions and answers (x, y, a, b)
satisfy some pre-defined winning condition. The most well-known non-local game is the CHSH game [5],
in which the inputs and outputs are all bits, i.e., x, y, a, b ∈ {0, 1}, and the winning condition is given
by the relation a⊕ b = x · y (namely, if this relation holds we say that Alice and Bob win).
Some non-local games have a special property that makes them useful in the context of DI cryptogra-
phy: there exist devices which perform measurements on entangled states that can succeed in the game
better than any classical, local devices. In particular, these classical devices do not use entanglement
to play the game. In the case of the CHSH game, for example, devices that do not use entanglement
can reach a winning probability of at most 75%, while a device measuring a maximally entangled state
with certain measurements leads to a winning probability of approximately 86% [5]. Observing that
the devices can be used to win the game with winning probability above the classical limit thus certifies
that entanglement is being used and, furthermore, that randomness, or entropy, is being produced. If a
sufficient amount of randomness is being produced then it can be used to create a shared key in DIQKD
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2protocols [6, 7]. This idea lies at the core of all DI cryptographic protocols.
As entanglement is a necessary resource for implementing DIQKD protocols, it is interesting to study
the relation between entanglement and DIQKD protocols or, more precisely, the key rates of such
protocols. Roughly speaking, the key rate of a protocol describes the length of a secret shared key
that can be created by executing the protocol. We say that a quantum state acts as a “resource” for a
DIQKD protocol if it can be used to execute the protocol, i.e., the device used in the protocol performs
some measurements on that resource state. When comparing protocols, a protocol that can extract
more key from the given resource state is a better protocol. Relating the amount1 of entanglement of a
resource state to the amount of extractable key using a DIQKD protocol tells us how useful that state
is in this context and can lead to fundamental insights in the study of quantum entanglement.
The most well-studied DIQKD protocol is based on the CHSH game and exploits one-way classical
communication from Alice to Bob (further details below); let us call this protocol the “standard proto-
col”. The focus of the previous works so far was to lower -bound the key rate, i.e., to find the minimal
length of a key that can be created, in terms of the relevant parameters of the protocol. With improved
lower bounds over the years [8–10], a tight lower bound was recently provided [11, 12].2 These lower
bounds can be seen as a statement regarding the minimal amount of key that can be extracted from
an entangled state, winning the CHSH game with a certain probability, using the standard DIQKD
protocol.
The following question then arises: Given an entangled resource state winning the CHSH game (or
some other non-local game), what is the maximal amount of key that can be extracted from it? To
maximize the key rate we can construct protocols that are potentially better than the standard protocol,
in terms of the amount of key that can be extracted for the given source considered. Answering the
above question is challenging as one first needs to come up with new potential protocols and then prove
their security with the hope of achieving better key rates. This is a daunting process that may last for
years without significant improvement in terms of the achieved parameters. To date, only one potential
protocol, employing two-way communication, was suggested and a partial security proof was given [14].3
Instead of embarking on the quest for better protocols one may take the somewhat opposite direction
and look for upper bounds on the possible key rates of a given resource state. More concretely, one
can aim to show that no alternative protocol can lead to key rates better than a certain upper bound.
This sheds light on the relation between entanglement and DIQKD protocols by setting limits on the
usefulness of entangled states for DIQKD protocols.
Such upper bounds on key rates are also relevant from the more “applicative” point of view. Wishing
to implement DIQKD protocols in experiments, we need to push the theory further so that the entangled
resource states needed for producing a positive key rate can be created in realistic noisy experimental
settings. Investigating upper bounds allows us to see the limitations of a whole class of protocols all
together, instead of looking for different protocols and analyzing them one by one.
Only a couple of recent works [16, 17] take this path and derive upper bounds on the key rates of
the most general DIQKD protocols. Of special interest for us is the work by Kaur et al. [16]. There,
a new information theoretic quantity, termed intrinsic non-locality, is introduced and shown to act as
an upper bound on the key rates of DIQKD protocols in the presence of a quantum adversary.4 The
intrinsic non-locality is defined via an optimization problem that for general correlations might be hard
to solve exactly. For protocols based on the CHSH game, an explicit upper bound obtained by relaxing
the optimization problem was derived in [16].
In this work, instead of working with the intrinsic non-locality, we consider a closely related
information-theoretic quantity called the intrinsic information [18], and use it to derive an upper
bound on the key rates of CHSH-based DIQKD protocols. Our bound is straightforward to derive and
significantly improves upon the bound presented in [16]. In some sense, the improvement builds on
insights related to the derivation of the lower bounds on the key rates of the standard protocol. This
is explained in detail in Section II C.
We then continue to study the relation between entanglement and DIQKD protocols by considering
the usefulness of bound-entangled states for such protocols. In 1999, Peres [19] conjectured that Bell
non-locality is equivalent to distillability of entanglement. Namely, bound-entangled states cannot be
1 The “amount of entanglement” can be quantified in different ways. In the scope of this work we consider the winning
probability of the state in a non-local game (such as the CHSH game) as the property quantifying entanglement.
2 The tight key rates of [12] match those achieved by a previous work [13] that considered a weaker form of security.
3 An additional recent result [15] presented a new protocol with higher rates compared to the standard protocol by
changing the “key generation” rounds rather than the classical processing steps.
4 This is in contrast to the work by Winczewski et al. [17], where a super-quantum adversary is considered. Upper bounds
on the key rates in the presence of such adversary do not imply upper bounds on the key rates in the presence of a
quantum adversary, which is the more relevant scenario.
3used to violate a Bell inequality or win a non-local game. After much effort the conjecture was disproven
and a bound-entangled state was shown to violate a Bell inequality [20]. In fact, the work [20] took one
step further and showed that the violation of the considered Bell inequality can also be used to certify
the production of randomness in the DI setting. That is, bound-entangled state are useful, in the sense
that they can be used as a resource for DI randomness certification protocols. A stronger version of
the Peres conjecture, stating that bound-entangled states cannot be used to violate so-called steering
inequalities, was also proven wrong [21].
We put forward a natural revised conjecture: Bound-entangled states cannot be used to produce a
secret key using DIQKD protocols. Our analysis of upper bounds for DIQKD protocols together with
examinations of the bound-entangled state known to violate the Bell inequality considered in [20] seem
to suggest that, in contrast to the original Peres Conjecture, the revised conjecture may hold.
The manuscript is arranged as follows. Section II deals with deriving upper bounds on the rates of
DIQKD protocols: we first define the device-dependent and DI secret key capacities in Section II A.
We then discuss the relevant information-theoretic quantities in Section II B, and present our explicit
bounds for protocols based on the CHSH inequality in Section II C. Finally, we present and explain the
“revised Peres conjecture” in Section III.
Notation. We use A,B, . . . to denote quantum registers while A,B, . . . are used for classical registers
or random variables (RV). We denote by lowercase letters a particular value of an RV, i.e., an RV X
defined on an alphabet X may take value x ∈ X with probability p(x). Quantum systems A,B, . . .
are associated with finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces HA,HB , . . . , and composite systems AB . . . are
described using the tensor product HA⊗HB⊗ . . . . A (mixed) quantum state ρA on a quantum register
A is a positive semidefinite linear operator of unit trace acting on HA. A pure state ψA has rank 1, and
may be identified with a normalized vector |ψ〉A ∈ HA satisfying ψA = |ψ〉〈ψ|A. A quantum channel
Λ: A→ B is a linear completely positive trace-preserving map between the algebras of linear operators
on HA and HB . We denote by IA the identity operator on HA, and by idA the identity map on the
algebra of linear operators on HA. A positive operator-valued measure (POVM) on HA is a collection
{Πx}x of operators acting on HA satisfying Πx ≥ 0 for all x and
∑
x Πx = IA. A classical RV X with
probability function p(x) can be regarded as a quantum state via the embedding ρX =
∑
x p(x)|x〉〈x|X
for some fixed orthonormal basis {|x〉X}x of HX. A classical-quantum or cq state is a state of the form
ρXA =
∑
x p(x)|x〉〈x|X⊗ρxA, where X is an RV with probability function p(x), and ρxA is a quantum state
on A for all x. This definition generalizes to more than two parties (i.e., ccq states) in the obvious way.
We also define the following entropic quantities for (quantum, classical, or hybrid) states ρABC and
its marginals:
• the von Neumann entropy H(A)ρ = −Tr(ρA log ρA);
• the conditional entropy H(A|B)ρ = H(AB)ρ −H(B)ρ;
• the mutual information I(A;B)ρ = H(A)ρ +H(B)ρ −H(AB)ρ = H(A)ρ −H(A|B)ρ;
• the conditional mutual information I(A;B|C)ρ = H(A|C)ρ −H(A|BC)ρ.
For classical states (i.e., probability distributions (p(x))x) the von Neumann entropy reduces to the
Shannon entropy H(X) = −∑x p(x) log p(x). In this paper all logarithms are taken to base 2. For
n ∈ N we use the notation [n] = {1, . . . , n}.
II. UPPER BOUNDS ON KEY RATES
A. Rates of Device-independent Key Distribution Protocols
A general DIQKD protocol proceeds in two stages: data generation and classical processing. The
“standard” protocol is given as Protocol 1 for reference. In the data generation stage Alice and Bob
use their devices to generate the classical raw data (a sequence of bits) by playing n non-local games,
one after the other. A “round” i ∈ [n] of the protocol corresponds to playing a single non-local game.
Some of the rounds are chosen at random to act as test rounds, in which the parties use the device to
play a non-local game such as the CHSH game. The other rounds are called key generation rounds,
where Alice and Bob choose predetermined inputs for the devices xˆ and yˆ, respectively (see, e.g., Step 7
4in Protocol 1). In protocols based on the CHSH protocol, for example, Alice and Bob play the CHSH
game with their devices n ∈ N times one after the other.5
In the classical processing stage Alice and Bob use the raw data gathered in the generation stage.
Firstly, they process the data to decide whether they should abort the protocol (in case they suspect
that the device is not sufficiently good to produce a secure key) or not. The decision is based on a
simple test: Alice and Bob count the fractions of the test rounds in which the non-local game is won;
if it is above a chosen expected winning probability ωexp they continue, otherwise they abort. This is
the parameter estimation step 9 in Protocol 1. Among other things, the key rate will be a function of
the chosen value for ωexp.
Next, if Alice and Bob do not abort the protocol, they use the data produced by the devices in the
key generation rounds, also called the raw key, to generate their final key. This is done by manipulating
the raw key in various way and using classical communication between Alice and Bob. We say that the
protocol employs one-way communication if the processing of the raw key is performed using classical
communication only from Alice to Bob, i.e., Bob does not send any information about his raw data
to Alice. The standard protocol is a one-way protocol (see Step 10 in Protocol 1). The most general
protocol can include communication in both directions and is termed a two-way communication protocol.
Protocol 1 The “standard” device-independent quantum key distribution protocol
Parameters:
n– number of rounds
ωexp– expected winning probability
Data generation stage:
1: For every round i ∈ [n] do Steps 2-8:
2: Alice and Bob choose ti ∈ {0, 1} at random.
3: If ti = 1 they perform a test round:
4: Alice and Bob choose xi ∈ {0, 1}, yi ∈ {0, 1} at random.
5: They input xi, yi to the device and record the outputs ai, bi.
6: If ti = 0 they perform a key generation round:
7: Alice and Bob use a fixed generation input xi = xˆ = 0, yi = yˆ = 2.
8: They input xi, yi to the device and record the outputs ai, bi.
Classical processing stage:
9: Parameter estimation: Alice and Bob estimate the average winning probability in the CHSH game from
the observed data in the test rounds. If it is below the expected winning probability, ωexp, they abort.
10: One-way classical post-processing: Alice and Bob apply a one-way error correction protocol and a
privacy amplification protocol (both classical) on their raw keys ~A and ~B.
The key rate of a QKD protocol is defined as the number of key bits, i.e., the length of the final key,
divided by the number n of rounds, or number of non-local games played during one execution of the
protocol. We consider below the asymptotic IID key rate, IID standing for “independent and identically
distributed”. This key rate refers to the rate of the protocol in the limit n→∞ and assuming that the
devices are acting exactly the same in each round i, namely, in all rounds the correlation obtained from
measuring the shared state is the same; see [22, Chapter 7] for further explanations. When looking for
lower bounds on the key rate of a protocol, considering the asymptotic IID setting is, at least a priori,
restrictive. In the context of the current work, however, this is not the case. As we are looking for upper
bounds, any possible strategy of the adversary, wishing to gain information about the key produced
by the protocol, sets an upper bound on the key rate. Indeed, one possibility for the adversary is to
prepare a device for Alice and Bob that behaves identically and independently in each round. The IID
assumption is common in information theory, as it describes a memoryless resource that acts in the
same way in each communication round.
To formally define key rates and capacities in this information-theoretic setting, let us get more
technical. Let |ψ〉ABE denote the purification of ρAB , shared between Alice, Bob and the adversary
5 One may also consider protocols where all the games are played at once, in parallel; see [22, Chapter 6]. For the purpose
of this work it does not matter if the games are played in sequence or in parallel.
5Eve (this state is a qqq-state, meaning, all registers are quantum). To get Alice’s classical outcome A,
her device measures ρA using what we call the key measurement : this is the measurement performed
by the device in the key generation round, i.e., the one performed for the input xˆ. In Protocol 1, for
example, this is the measurement associated with the input x = 0 (Step 7). The state |ψ〉ABE together
with Alice’s key measurement give us the cqq-state ρABE , where the measured system A is classical,
and B and E are quantum.
For device-dependent QKD protocols in terms of a cqq state ρABE as defined above, the cqq-key
capacity Kcqq(ρABE) quantifies the amount of secure key that can be extracted from IID copies of
ρABE . Informally, this capacity can be defined as follows (see App. A for a formal definition):
Definition 1 (Device-dependent cqq-key capacity (informal)). Given n IID copies of a cqq state ρABE ,
the cqq-key capacity Kcqq(ρABE) is defined as the largest key that can be extracted by Alice and Bob
from ρ⊗nABE using local operations and public communication (LOPC) which allow Eve to learn only
vanishing information about the established key (in the limit n→∞). 
It was shown by Devetak and Winter [23] and by Renner and Christandl [24] that this cqq-key
capacity is bounded from below by
Kcqq(ρABE) ≥ H(A|E)−H(A|B) . (1)
This lower bound is achieved by protocols employing one-way communication to perform error correction
and privacy amplification in the classical processing step of the protocol. Other more sophisticated
protocols, e.g., protocols that use classical two-way communication, may improve on the lower bound
given in Eq. (1).
If Bob’s key measurement is also fixed (in addition to Alice’s measurement), then Alice and Bob’s
starting point is a ccq-state ρABE , derived by measuring the cqq-state ρABE with Bob’s key measurement
associated to his input yˆ. The corresponding key capacity of such a ccq-state can be defined informally
as follows (see App. A for a formal definition):
Definition 2 (Device-dependent ccq-key capacity (informal)). Given n IID copies of a ccq state ρABE ,
the ccq-key capacity Kccq(ρABE) is defined as the largest key that can be extracted by Alice and Bob
from ρ⊗nABE using local operations and public communication (LOPC) which allow Eve to learn only
vanishing information about the established key (in the limit n→∞). 
We now turn our attention to device-independent key capacities. We first introduce some terminology
and notation. All DIQKD protocols include a parameter estimation step in which Alice and Bob choose
whether to abort or not. This is done according to the statistics that they observe, p(a, b|x, y), also
termed a correlation. Consider now a tuple (σABE , {Λxa}a, {Λyb}b) comprising a qqq-state σABE and
POVMs {Λxa}a, {Λyb}b, where it is understood that the tuple includes the POVMs for all x and y. We
define the set Σ (p(a, b|x, y)) of all such tuples compatible with a given correlation p(a, b|x, y):
Σ (p(a, b|x, y)) = {(σABE , {Λxa}a, {Λyb}b) | Tr [(Λxa ⊗ Λyb ⊗ IE)σABE ] = p(a, b|x, y)} . (2)
Abusing notation, we write that σ ∈ Σ (p(a, b|x, y)) if there exists a tuple with the state σ (and suitable
measurements). Then, σxˆ,yˆABE is the state resulting from measuring σ with the measurements in σ’s tuple
that are associated with the predetermined “key generation” inputs xˆ ∈ X and yˆ ∈ Y (as in Step 7 in
Protocol 1).
In order to define DIQKD rates and capacities, we consider IID distributions p(a, b|x, y)×n =∏n
i=1 p(ai, bi|xi, yi), which arise from Alice and Bob using the same correlation p(a, b|x, y) in each
round of the protocol. The states and measurements giving rise to p(a, b|x, y)×n comprise the set
Σ (p(a, b|x, y)×n). For a state σAnBnEn ∈ Σ (p(a, b|x, y)×n) compatible with the correlation p×n, only
the state σxˆ,yˆAnBnEn obtained from using the key generation measurements xˆ, yˆ in each of the n rounds is
relevant for generating the key. This state is given by
σxˆ,yˆAnBnEn =
∑
an,bn
|an〉〈an|An ⊗ |bn〉〈bn|Bn ⊗ TrAnBn
[(
Πxˆ
n
an ⊗Πyˆ
n
bn ⊗ IEn
)
σAnBnEn
]
, (3)
where xˆn = (xˆ, . . . , xˆ) and similarly for yˆn.
We are now ready to define the DI key capacity of a correlation.
Definition 3 (Device-independent key capacity of a correlation). Let p(a, b|x, y) be a correlation and
xˆ ∈ X , yˆ ∈ Y be a predetermined pair of inputs called the key generation inputs.
6(i) A key distillation protocol consists of a sequence {Λn}n∈N of maps Λn : AnBnEn → KAKBEn com-
prising local operations (with respect to the Alice-Bob-Eve partition) and public communication
(LOPC), where KA and KB are the classical systems holding the final key of Alice and Bob. The
goal of the protocol is for Alice and Bob to establish a classical maximally correlated state
τLKAKB =
1
2L
2L∑
i=1
|i〉〈i|KA ⊗ |i〉〈i|KB (4)
so that Eve obtains only vanishing information about the key. A key distillation protocol is deemed
secure in the device-independent setting if it produces a secure key for every state σ consistent
with the observed correlation p(a, b|x, y). More formally, given ε > 0 and a key size Ln for n ∈ N,
we require for all states σAnBnEn ∈ Σ (p(a, b|x, y)×n) that∥∥∥Λn (σxˆ,yˆAnBnEn)− τLnKAKB ⊗ ρEn∥∥∥1 ≤ ε, (5)
where σxˆ,yˆAnBnEn is defined in (3), and ρEn = TrKAKBΛn
(
σxˆ,yˆAnBnEn
)
.
(ii) Given a sequence {Ln}n∈N, a rate L = lim supn→∞(Ln/n) is called achievable if (5) holds for
all ε > 0 and sufficiently large n. The device-independent key capacity KDI(p(a, b|x, y), xˆ, yˆ) of a
correlation p(a, b|x, y) with key generation inputs xˆ, yˆ is defined as
KDI(p(a, b|x, y), xˆ, yˆ) = sup{L : L is achievable.}. (6)

An important aspect of Definition 3 is that the security criterion (5) for protocols as in Definition 3(i)
applies to all states σAnBnEn ∈ Σ (p(a, b|x, y)×n). In particular, it holds for IID extension σ⊗nABE for
any state σABE ∈ Σ (p(a, b|x, y)). It then follows immediately that we have the following simple upper
bound on the DI capacity:
KDI(p(a, b|x, y), xˆ, yˆ) ≤ inf
σ∈Σ(p(a,b|x,y))
Kccq(σ
xˆ,yˆ
ABE), (7)
where Kccq is the ccq-capacity from Definition 2. Note that Definition 3 captures the fact that the
conditions according to which a DI protocol aborts or not depend only on the observed correlation
p(a, b|x, y) (assuming that errors in the classical post-processing steps vanish asymptotically).
When considering arbitrary states in the set Σ (p(a, b|x, y)×n) we cover protocols that can use the full
knowledge of the correlation. In many cases, however, one considers protocols in which the aborting
condition does not depend on the entire correlation, but only on partial information regarding it. The
most common parameters relevant for deciding whether to abort the protocol or not are the expected
winning probability ωexp in a certain non-local game and the expected quantum bit error rate
Qexp = Pr [A 6= B|X = xˆ,Y = yˆ] , (8)
defined for the predetermined inputs xˆ, yˆ.6 For any correlation p(a, b|x, y), the winning probability
ω in the relevant non-local game and the expected error rate Q can be calculated from the correla-
tion p(a, b|x, y). That is, for any given p(a, b|x, y)
ω = ω(p) (9)
Q = Q(p) . (10)
For n ∈ N let Σˆn(ω?, Q?) be the following set of tuples:
Σˆn(ω
?, Q?) =
⋃
p(a,b|x,y) :
ω(p)=ω?∧Q(p)=Q?
Σ
(
p(a, b|x, y)×n) (11)
6 Protocol 1 aborts if the observed average winning probability is below the expected winning probability ωexp. Even
though not explicitly written, the error correction protocol applied as part of the classical post-processing aborts with
high probability when the observed error rate is above Qexp. Therefore, also in the standard protocol the two relevant
parameters are ωexp and Qexp.
7We abbreviate Σˆ(ω?, Q?) ≡ Σˆ1(ω?, Q?). Similarly to what was done above, we write that σ ∈
Σˆn(ω
?, Q?) if there exists a tuple with the state σ and, as before in (3), σxˆ,yˆAnBnEn is the state ob-
tained from measuring σAnBnEn with the measurements in σ’s tuple that are associated with the inputs
xˆ and yˆ.
We can then define the DI key capacity of ω? and Q? as follows.
Definition 4 (Device-independent key-capacity of a winning probability). For any ω? and Q?, the DI
key capacity KDI(ω
?, Q?) of ω? and Q? is defined exactly in the same way as in Definition 3, except
that now the security criterion (5) needs to hold for all σAnBnEn ∈ Σˆn (ω?, Q?) . 
Clearly, for any p(a, b|x, y) with ω(p) = ω? and Q(p) = Q?,
KDI(p(a, b|x, y), xˆ, yˆ) ≥ KDI(ω?, Q?) , (12)
where xˆ, yˆ are related to Q? via Equation (8). Moreover, it holds that σ⊗nABE ∈ Σˆn(ω?, Q?) for any
σABE ∈ Σˆ(ω?, Q?), which gives us the following simple upper bound on KDI(ω?, Q?) in analogy with
(7) above:
KDI(ω
?, Q?) ≤ inf
σ∈Σˆ(ω?,Q?)
Kccq(σ
xˆ,yˆ
ABE). (13)
In summary, the following sequence of inequalities holds between the key capacities defined above:
KDI(ω
?, Q?) ≤ KDI(p(a, b|x, y), xˆ, yˆ) ≤ Kccq(ρABE) ≤ Kcqq(ρABE) , (14)
for any ρABE ∈ Σˆ(ω?, Q?).
In the above we defined the rates and capacities with respect to the generation inputs xˆ, yˆ. In a recent
work [15] a new protocol with two generation inputs was suggested. Our definitions can be directly
extended to include such protocols, and the same applies to the proofs given below.
Note that the winning probability of a state in a non-local game, or the correlation that it can give
rise to by measuring it, can be used to quantify the amount of entanglement of the state. Defining the
DI key capacities in terms of these quantities, as done above, paves the way to studying the usefulness
of entanglement in the context of DIQKD protocols.
B. Intrinsic Information and Non-locality
In this section we discuss two information-theoretic quantities that serve as upper bounds on DI key
capacities: the intrinsic information [18] and the intrinsic non-locality [16].
1. Intrinsic Information
We first define the intrinsic information of a tripartite state, a quantum generalization of the classical
intrinsic information that can be used to upper-bound the amount of secret key distillable from tripartite
classical probability distributions [25]. Recall that for tripartite quantum states ρABE the quantum
conditional mutual information is defined as I(A;B|E)ρ = H(AE)ρ +H(BE)ρ −H(E)ρ −H(ABE)ρ.
Definition 5 (Intrinsic information; [18]). The intrinsic information I(A;B ↓ E)ρ of a tripartite
quantum state ρABE is defined as
I(A;B ↓ E)ρ = inf
Λ: E→E′
I(A;B|E′)σ, (15)
where the infimum is taken over quantum systems E′ and quantum channels Λ: E → E′, and σABE′ =
(idAB ⊗Λ)(ρABE).
Christandl et al. showed that the intrinsic information is an upper bound on the key capacity of a
qqq-state ρABE [18, Theorem 3.5]. Specializing this result to a ccq state ρABE and the corresponding
key capacity from Definition 2, we have the following lemma.
8Lemma 6 ([18]). For any ccq-state ρABE,
Kccq(ρABE) ≤ I(A;B ↓ E)ρ. (16)
When evaluating the intrinsic information or conditional mutual information on a specific state σx,yABE
in a ccq state σABE , we use the following notation for better readability:
I(A;B ↓ E)σ(x,y) ≡ I(A;B ↓ E)σx,y I(A;B|E)σ(x,y) ≡ I(A;B|E)σx,y (17)
Lemma 6 translates to the following upper bounds on the device-independent key capacities defined
in Sec. II A:
Lemma 7. For any correlation p(a, b|x, y) and xˆ ∈ X , yˆ ∈ Y,
KDI(p(a, b|x, y), xˆ, yˆ) ≤ inf
σ∈Σ(p(a,b|x,y))
I(A;B ↓ E)σ(xˆ,yˆ) ≤ inf
σ∈Σ(p(a,b|x,y))
I(A;B|E)σ(xˆ,yˆ) . (18)
Similarly,
KDI(ω
?, Q?) ≤ inf
σ∈Σˆ(ω?,Q?)
I(A;B ↓ E)σ(xˆ,yˆ) ≤ inf
σ∈Σˆ(ω?,Q?)
I(A;B|E)σ(xˆ,yˆ) . (19)
Proof. In both equations, the first inequality follows directly by using Lemma 6 in combination with
the capacity upper bounds (7) and (13), respectively. The second inequality follows from picking the
identity channel idE : E → E in the definition (15) of the intrinsic information.
We note here that the definition of I(A;B ↓ E)σ involves an optimization over quantum channels
Λ: E → E′ and quantum systems E′ for which there is no known efficient algorithm: there are no
known cardinality bounds on the auxiliary system E′ for quantities based on the conditional mutual
information such as the intrinsic information or the (related) squashed entanglement [26]. Moreover,
for general states σAB the dimension of the auxiliary system might have to be taken much larger than
|A||B| [27]. However, picking the identity channel yields a simple, albeit potentially less tight, upper
bound on the key capacities, which we will employ in Section II C.
2. Intrinsic Non-locality
Recently, Kaur et al. [16] introduced a new information-theoretic quantity termed the “quantum
intrinsic non-locality” (QINL). In the notation of [16], the QINL is defined as follows.
Definition 8 (Quantum intrinsic non-locality; [16]). For a correlation p(a, b|x, y), the quantum intrinsic
non-locality NQ(A;B)p is defined as
NQ(A;B)p = sup
p(x,y)
inf
σABE
∑
x,y
p(x, y)I(A;B|E)σ(x,y), (20)
where p(x, y) is a bipartite probability distribution, and the infimum is over states σABE of the form
σABE =
∑
x,y
p(x, y)σx,yABE (21a)
with σx,yABE =
∑
a,b
|a〉〈a|A ⊗ |b〉〈b|B ⊗ TrAB [(Λxa ⊗ Λyb ⊗ IE) ρABE ] . (21b)
Here, {Λxa}a and {Λyb}b are POVMs for all x, y, and ρABE is any tripartite state such that
Tr [(Λxa ⊗ Λyb ⊗ IE) ρABE ] = p(a, b|x, y). (21c)
9The QINL can be used to upper-bound a DI key capacity defined in a slightly different way than
the one we use here; see p. 31 and Theorem 22 in the arXiv version of [16]. A priori it seems like the
definition from [16, Page 31] may be more general than Definitions 3 and 4 presented above. Roughly
speaking, the main difference between the definitions is that in our work we always consider a “special”
pair of inputs xˆ, yˆ which are used to generate the key (in contrast to other inputs that are used to
test the device). In protocols such as Protocol 1, the special predetermined inputs are used in order
to potentially increase the key rate of the protocol. It is therefore not clear if our definition is more
restrictive than the one used in [16]. Indeed, the lower bounds studied in the literature are derived
from a protocol admissible in both our Definitions 3, 4 and the one in [16]. We leave this question
unanswered and distinguish explicitly between the definitions when relevant below. Furthermore, we
discuss in Appendix B how our results transfer to the setting of [16].
C. Explicit Bounds for CHSH-based Protocols
Our goal now is to derive explicit upper bounds on the key rate of any DIQKD protocol based on
the CHSH game. By saying that the protocol is based on the CHSH game we mean that the decision
on whether to abort the protocol or not depends on the observed winning probability ω in the CHSH
game. For convenience, in this section we switch to work with the violation S ∈ [2, 2√2] of the CHSH
inequality instead of the winning probability. The two are related via ω = 1/2 + S/8. An additional
parameter of the protocol is the observed quantum bit error rate Q ∈ [0, 0.5] (defined in (8)).
To get our upper bound we first use that, for all S and Q and for all ρABE ∈ Σˆ(S,Q),
KDI(S,Q) ≤ inf
σ∈Σˆ(S,Q)
I(A;B|E)σ(xˆ,yˆ) ≤ I(A;B|E)ρ(xˆ,yˆ) , (22)
which follows directly from Lemma 7.
To derive an explicit upper bound one may choose any ρABE ∈ Σˆ(S,Q), and the associated measure-
ment in ρ’s tuple in Σˆ(S,Q), and directly calculate I(A;B|E)ρ(xˆ,yˆ). Motivated by the work of Pironio
et al. [13] dealing with lower bounds for a CHSH-based DIQKD protocol, we make the following choice
of state and measurements.7
Alice and Bob’s quantum state is chosen to be
ρ˜AB =
1 + C
2
|Φ+〉〈Φ+|+ 1− C
2
|Φ−〉〈Φ−|, (23)
where C =
√
(S/2)2 − 1 and |Φ±〉 = (|00〉±|11〉)/
√
2. The measurements for the test rounds, associated
with inputs x, y ∈ {0, 1}, are associated with the observables
A0 = σz B0 =
1√
1 + C2
σz +
C√
1 + C2
σx (24)
A1 = σx B1 =
1√
1 + C2
σz − C√
1 + C2
σx, (25)
where σx, σz are the well-known Pauli X- and Z-matrices. For the key generation rounds associated
with the inputs xˆ = 0 and yˆ = 2, Alice’s device measures A0 = σz, and Bob’s device uses the B2 = σz
measurement with probability 1 − 2Q, and a random bit with probability 2Q. This choice ensures an
observed quantum bit error rate Q.
Consider a purification of the state ρ˜AB in (23),
|ψ〉ABE =
√
1 + C
2
|Φ+〉AB |0〉E +
√
1− C
2
|Φ−〉AB |1〉E , (26)
7 Recall that for DIQKD protocols based on binary test events (such as CHSH-based protocols), the analysis of lower
bounds on key rates for collective attacks may w.l.o.g. be restricted to two-qubit systems, as proved in [13]. However,
we note that this result is not needed for our analysis of upper bounds as we may pick any state (IID or non-IID)
compatible with the observed statistics (cf. Sec. II A and II B).
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FIG. 1: Surface plot of the intrinsic information I(A;B|E)ρ˜xˆ,ˆy given in Theorem 9 for S ∈ [2, 2
√
2] and
Q ∈ [0, 1/2], where ρ˜xˆ,yˆABE is defined in (27). Note that S and Q are uncorrelated here. The black line is
the bound given in Corollary 10, obtained from setting Q = 12 (1− S/(2
√
2)).
and let ρ˜xˆ,yˆABE be the effective state obtained in the key generation round, i.e., the state obtained from
Alice’s device measuring A0 and Bob’s device measuring B2 on |ψ〉〈ψ|ABE :
ρ˜xˆ,yˆABE =
1−Q
2
(|00〉〈00|AB ⊗ ρ˜+E + |11〉〈11|AB ⊗ ρ˜−E)+ Q2 (|01〉〈01|AB ⊗ ρ˜+E + |10〉〈10|AB ⊗ ρ˜−E) ,
ρ˜±E =
1
2
(
1 + C ±√1− C2
±√1− C2 1− C
)
.
(27)
The above state and measurements are of special importance: they saturate the lower bound on
KDI(S,Q) derived by Pironio et al. [13]. Using Eq. (22), we now use the same state and measurements
to derive an upper bound on KDI(S,Q):
KDI(S,Q) ≤ I(A;B|E)ρ˜(xˆ,yˆ) , (28)
with ρ˜xˆ,yˆABE as defined in (27). The right-hand side of (28) can be expressed in analytical form, as stated
in Theorem 9 below. The resulting upper bound is plotted as a surface in Figure 1 for S ∈ [2, 2√2] and
Q ∈ [0, 1/2].
Theorem 9. For any S ∈ [2, 2√2] and Q ∈ [0, 1/2],
KDI(S,Q) ≤ 1 + h(aS,Q)− h(Q)− h
(
(1 +
√
(S/2)2 − 1)/2
)
, (29)
where aS,Q =
1
2
(
1 +
√
1 +Q(1−Q)(S2 − 8)
)
, and h(x) = −x log x − (1 − x) log(1 − x) is the binary
entropy.
Proof. Lemma 7 gives an upper bound on the device-independent key capacity KDI(S,Q) in terms of
the intrinsic information of the state ρ˜xˆ,yˆABE defined in (27):
KDI(S,Q) ≤ I(A;B|E)ρ˜(xˆ,yˆ). (30)
A simple calculation then shows that I(A;B|E)ρ˜(xˆ,yˆ) is equal to the right-hand side of (29).
Any relation between S and Q can be chosen when constructing the protocol. To optimize the key
rate, the relation between S and Q should fit the relation that Alice and Bob expect to see in the
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FIG. 2: Comparison of achievable key rates and upper bounds plotted against CHSH violation S
(lower x-axis) and CHSH winning probability ω (upper x-axis). The device-independent key rate
evaluated in [13] is plotted in red/circles. The entropy rate is plotted in yellow/squares. The upper
bound given by the dark blue line with triangle markers is the upper bound from Corollary 10, itself
an upper bound on the intrinsic information I(A;B ↓ E)ρ from Definition 5. All entropic quantities in
the bounds above are evaluated on the state ρ˜xˆ,yˆABE defined in (27). The light blue/diamonds line is the
upper bound derived in [16].
honest implementation of the protocol. A common choice is to consider an honest implementation of
the protocol in which maximally entangled states are being sent through a depolarizing channel with
parameter ν ∈ [0, 4/3]. Alice and Bob then expect to hold a state
τAB = (1− ν)|Φ+〉〈Φ+|+ νI/4 , (31)
for which the relation S = 2
√
2(1− 2Q) holds, with Q = ν/2. This relation gives the well-known noise
threshold of 7.1%; see [11, Figure 5]. We continue below with the relation S = 2
√
2(1− 2Q) so we can
compare our upper bound to that of [16]. In this situation, the bound in Theorem 9 can be specialized
to the following:
Corollary 10. Let S ∈ [2,√2] be given and set Q = 12 (1− S/(2
√
2)) (such as in the honest implemen-
tation of the CHSH protocol using a depolarizing channel considered above). Then,
KDI(S,Q) ≤ 1 + h(aS)− h(Q)− h
(
(1 +
√
(S/2)2 − 1)/2
)
, (32)
where aS =
1
2 +
1
4
√
2
√−32 + 16S2 − S4.
We remark here that numerically optimizing the conditional mutual information I(A;B|E′)ρ over
quantum channels Λ: E → E′ for small E′ did not yield any improvement over (32).
The upper bound given in Eq. (32) is plotted in dark blue/triangles in Fig. 2 as a function of S. Our
upper bound is compared to the upper bound derived in [16, Eq. (253)] from the QINL NQ(A,B)p,
for p(a, b|x, y) with violation S,8 appearing as the light blue/diamonds curve in Fig. 2. Evidently, our
upper bound in Eq. (28) is tighter than the bound of [16] for any S ∈ [2, 2√2].
Inspecting the proof method of [16] reveals a possible explanation of this: given the correlation p with
CHSH violation S, the bound in [16, Eq. (253)] is obtained from evaluating the intrinsic information
of τAB defined in Eq. (31), together with a convex decomposition argument similar to that used in
8 The QINL is a function of the entire correlation p(a, b|x, y), not of just S. However, the derivation of the bound in [16,
Eq. (253)] depends only on S and, de facto, identifies the special inputs xˆ, yˆ defining Q. Thus, the bounds can be easily
compared.
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[28]. In fact, the bound stays the same when neglecting the quantum register of the adversary, which
corresponds to choosing the trivial quantum channel Tr: E → C in (15).
In contrast, we obtain our bound (28) by evaluating the intrinsic information of the state ρ˜AB in
(23) (resp. ρ˜xˆ,yˆABE in (27)), which Pironio et al. [13] showed to be Eve’s optimal attack for a given CHSH
violation S. Crucially, measuring ρ˜AB with the measurements chosen by Eve can be used to “simulate”
the same correlations of the state τAB used in [16]. Fig. 2 shows that the state ρ˜
xˆ,yˆ
ABE is not only optimal
in terms of the (minimal) key distillation rate, but also a more judicious choice that decreases the
intrinsic information, resulting in a tighter upper bound on the key rate.
As a final remark let us note that, as mentioned before, Kaur et al. consider a potentially more general
definition for a DI key capacity [16]. For DI protocols based on CHSH, our upper bound in Theorem 9
can also be used directly to upper-bound the rates defined in [16] for a certain regime of the violation
S. We refer to Appendix B for details.
III. REVISED PERES CONJECTURE
A. Bound Entanglement and Device-independent Cryptography
Entanglement is an essential resource in quantum cryptography. In the case of QKD, if Alice and Bob
share a maximally entangled state then they can measure it to produce private and identical keys. With
the same idea in mind, entangled states from which maximally entangled states can be distilled can also
be used to produce a key. Perhaps surprisingly, private keys can also be produced from bound entangled
states, namely, states whose entanglement cannot be distilled [29]—an observation that initiated the rich
study of the so called “private states” [30, 31]. A similar situation is encountered in the study of quantum
channel capacities.9 There are quantum channels which are useless for generating entanglement between
the communicating parties, yet it is possible to generate a secret key using these channels [30, 36]. This
phenomenon lies at the heart of “superactivation” of quantum capacity, where two channels with zero
quantum capacity can be used together to generate entanglement at a positive rate [37].
A related question regarding the usefulness of bound entangled states was asked by Peres [19]. He
conjectured that distillability is equivalent to Bell non-locality, i.e., bound entangled states cannot
violate a Bell inequality (and hence cannot act as a resource for DI cryptography). After an extensive
search for bound entangled states and Bell inequalities that violate them, the conjecture was disproven
by Vertesi and Brunner [20]. It was further shown that the bound entangled state found in [20] can
be used to produce randomness in a DI way, implying that it is a useful resource for DI randomness
certification protocols.
DIQKD protocols are more demanding than randomness certification protocols—not only should
Alice have a random string, but Bob needs to hold the same one. The results of [20], therefore, do not
imply that bound entangled states can be used to produce a key using a DIQKD protocol. We raise
the following natural conjecture, a revision of the original Peres conjecture:
Conjecture 11. Bound entangled states cannot be used to produce a key by any DIQKD protocol.
If true, the conjecture would imply a fundamental distinction between (device-dependent) QKD and
DIQKD—bound entangled states are a useful resource for the former but useless for the latter.
B. First Evidence
As a first piece of evidence in favor of the conjecture, we show that the bound entangled state of [20]
cannot be used to produce a key in a DIQKD protocol of the form of Protocol 1. The bound entangled
state of [20] is given by
ρ =
4∑
i=1
λi|ψi〉〈ψi| with λ =
(
3257
6884
,
450
1721
,
450
1721
,
27
6884
)
, (33)
9 We note here that both the quantum and private capacity of a quantum channel are not enhanced by forward classical
communication from the sender to the receiver [32–35]. Hence, generating entanglement and secret key using a quantum
channel and forward classical communication are the ‘dynamic’ analogues of one-way entanglement distillation and one-
way secret key distillation, respectively (see also [23]).
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and, for a =
√
131
2 , the states |ψi〉 ∈ C3 × C3 are
|ψ1〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉) (34)
|ψ2〉 = a
12
(|01〉+ |10〉) + 1
60
|02〉 − 3
10
|21〉 (35)
|ψ3〉 = a
12
(|00〉 − |11〉) + 1
60
|12〉+ 3
10
|20〉 (36)
|ψ4〉 = 1√
3
(−|01〉+ |10〉+ |22〉) . (37)
The state ρ can be used to violate a certain Bell inequality constructed in [20]. The relevant informa-
tion in our context is that the inequality is such that Alice has three possible inputs x ∈ {0, 1, 2}, with
two outcomes for all measurements, namely, a ∈ {0, 1}. Bob has two possible measurements y ∈ {0, 1}.
For y = 0 he has three possible outcomes and for y = 1 two outcomes; we write b ∈ {0, 1, 2} in both
cases.
The state in Eq. (33) can be used to violate the inequality of [20, Eq. (4)] when measured with the
operators described as follows. For Alice, let q = 1/5 and
|A0〉 = −q|0〉+
√
3q|1〉+
√
1− 4q2|2〉 (38)
|A1〉 = 2q|0〉+
√
1− 4q2|2〉 (39)
|A2〉 = −q|0〉 −
√
3q|1〉+
√
1− 4q2|2〉 . (40)
Alice’s measurement operators are then defined via Ma=0|x = |Ax〉〈Ax| and Ma=1|x = I −Ma=0|x. For
Bob’s first measurement, we set Mb|0 = |Bb0〉〈Bb0 | for b ∈ {0, 1} with
|B00〉 =
√
2
3
|1〉+ 1√
3
|2〉 (41)
|B10〉 = −
1√
2
|0〉 − 1√
6
|1〉+ 1√
3
|2〉 (42)
and M2|0 = I−M0|0−M1|0. Bob’s second measurement is given by M0|1 = |2〉〈2| and M1|1 = I−M0|1.
As shown in [20, Table 1], measuring Bob’s states with either of his measurements produces random-
ness that can be certified via the observed Bell violation. In other words, any state and measurements
leading to the violation achieved by the specific state and measurements above must lead to non-
deterministic outcomes on Bob’s side. This means that the considered bound entangled state is a useful
resource for DI randomness certification protocols.
Consider a modified version of Protocol 1, where instead of playing the CHSH game (checking for
the violation of the CHSH inequality) the used Bell inequality is that of [20, Eq. (4)]. As the state and
measurements violate the inequality, using them to execute the protocol will not cause the protocol to
abort in the parameter estimation step with high probability. Let us consider the case in which the
communication is from Alice to Bob, and Alice’s key measurement is x ∈ {0, 1, 2}. According to [23]
(recall also Eq. (1)), the entropy difference
H(A|E)−H(A|B) , (43)
evaluated on the cqq-state ρxABE is a bound on the key rate of the protocol mentioned above. We
remark that this is an upper bound on the DI key rate of the protocol, which should be evaluated on
the ccq-state ρx,yˆABE , with yˆ = 2 a special key generation input not used for testing, similarly to the
setting in Protocol 1. Using the data-processing inequality with respect to Bob’s measurement then
shows that H(A|E)−H(A|B) ≥ H(A|E)−H(A|B) in this situation.
Similarly, one can consider a protocol in which the one-way communication is from Bob to Alice,
Bob’s key measurement is y ∈ {0, 1} and Alice has a special key measurement xˆ = 3 not used for
testing. The relevant bound is then
H(B|E)−H(B|A) , (44)
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evaluated on the qcq-state ρyABE . In both cases, direct calculation shows that
max
x
{H(A|E)−H(A|B)} ≤ 0 and max
y
{H(B|E)−H(B|A)} ≤ 0 . (45)
We learn from the above that the considered bound entangled state and measurements, which can pro-
duce randomness, cannot produce a key using a one-way DIQKD protocol.10 This does not mean that
other more complex protocols cannot use this state to produce a key in a DI way. Yet, as bound entan-
gled states are a useful resource also for one-way device-dependent QKD protocols [30, 36], considering
one-way DIQKD as above is an interesting starting point.
IV. DISCUSSION AND OPEN QUESTIONS
In this work we used the intrinsic information to upper-bound the extractable key rates of a state
using a DIQKD protocol. Our approach captures protocols in which a “special” generation input pair,
(xˆ, yˆ), is used to generate the key in the protocol. As shown in Section II C, our method yields tighter
upper bounds compared to those derived in [16]. The work can be directly extended to cover protocols
in which several special generation inputs are used, e.g., the protocol suggested in [15]. We note here
once again that the QINL of [16] does not refer to special generation inputs and hence may be more
general. A first interesting open question is whether protocols that do not use some fixed (set of)
generation inputs can lead to higher key rates and, if so, in which regime of parameters.
To derive our explicit bounds we evaluated the intrinsic information on the state minimizing the key
rate of the standard protocol [13]. It is intriguing to understand the relation between lower and upper
bounds in this respect. Does the same state minimize both the lower and the upper bound on the
standard protocol key rate? This question will be the subject of future investigation.
Presenting a violation of a Bell inequality is believed to be weaker than the ability to extract a DI
key, i.e., some correlations may violate a Bell inequality but cannot be used to produce a key using
a DIQKD protocol. Indeed, Conjecture 11 deals with one special case of this form. It is therefore
interesting to find thresholds below which no key can be created using any DIQKD protocol (meaning,
below a certain violation or above a certain noise level it it impossible to extract a key). We want
to point out a fundamental shortcoming of upper bounds derived from faithful information-theoretic
quantities. Here, a real-valued non-negative function f evaluated on a correlation p(a, b|x, y) is called
faithful if f(p) = 0 holds if and only if p is classical, i.e., it admits a local hidden-variable model.
In the context of DIQKD, faithful measures are not desirable since upper bounds derived from them
cannot lead to non-trivial thresholds on the key rate– a faithful measure must be strictly positive when
evaluated on non-local correlations or states that violate a Bell inequality. Thus, even if there exists
a certain threshold on the Bell violation (e.g., for the CHSH inequality) under which the correlation
cannot be used to produce a key using any DIQKD, this will not be revealed by a faithful measure.
The QINL was shown to be faithful in [16]; likewise, we show in Appendix B that the (worst-case)
intrinsic information evaluated on the state and measurements from [13] (see Sec. II C) upper-bounds
the QINL, and hence inherits faithfulness from the latter. Finding quantities that are not faithful and
yet can be used to upper-bound the key rates of DIQKD protocols is an important open question, as
such quantities may lead to improved thresholds on DIQKD.
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Appendix A: Formal definitions of device-dependent key capacities
The following definition of a cqq-key capacity is adapted from the definition of key capacity in [18,
Definition 2.2] to the cqq case.
16
Definition 12. Let ρABE be cqq state. Given n IID copies of ρABE , a key distillation protocol consists
of a sequence (Λn)n∈N of maps Λn : AnBnEn → KAKBEn consisting of local (with respect to the Alice-
Bob-Eve partition) operations and public communication (LOPC), where KA and KB are the classical
systems holding the final key of Alice and Bob. We require that (a) the map restricted to H⊗nA is
classical, i.e., given by a stochastic map, and (b) the restriction to H⊗nB ⊗H⊗nE is completely positive
and trace-preserving (CPTP). The goal of the protocol is to transform ρ⊗nABE into a state close to the
following ccq-state with perfect key of length L:
τLABE =
1
2L
2L∑
i=1
|i〉〈i|A ⊗ |i〉〈i|B ⊗ τE , (A1)
where τE is some arbitrary fixed state independent of i. We call a key rate L achievable, if there is a
key distillation protocol (Λn)n∈N and (Ln)n∈N such that
(i) lim
n→∞
∥∥∥Λn (ρ⊗nABE)− τLnAnBnEn∥∥∥
1
= 0 (A2)
(ii) lim sup
n→∞
Ln
n
= L. (A3)
The key capacity of a cqq-state ρABE is defined as Kcqq(ρABE) = sup{L ∈ R : L is achievable}. 
We also specialize this definition to a ccq-state ρABE obtained from measuring Bob’s system of the
state ρABE :
Definition 13. The key capacity Kccq(ρABE) of a ccq-state ρABE is defined in the same way as in
Definition 12, except that here the restriction of the LOPC maps Λn for n ∈ N to AnBn is taken to be
classical, and the restriction to En is CPTP. 
Note that, by definition, for any pair of states ρABE and ρABE related via a measurement on Bob’s
marginal,
Kccq(ρABE) ≤ Kcqq(ρABE) , (A4)
since the set of admissible protocols in the ccq case is a subset of the cqq-admissible protocols.
Appendix B: Theorem 9 and alternate definitions of the DI key capacity
Our upper bound in Theorem 9 is a bound on the DI key capacities defined in Definitions 3 and 4
in the CHSH scenario. In this appendix we investigate the relationship between our setting and the
alternative definition of DI key capacity on p. 31 in the arXiv version of [16]. In that paper, Kaur
et al. introduce the quantum intrinsic non-locality NQ(A;B)p (see Definition 8 in the main text) and
show that it is an upper bound on their definition of DI key capacity. We show in the following that
for a certain range of the CHSH violation S our bound from Theorem 9 is also an upper bound on
NQ(A;B)p, and hence also upper-bounds the DI key capacity as defined in [16].
To see this, note that for a given correlation p(a, b|x, y) the quantum intrinsic non-locality NQ(A,B)p
can be rewritten in our notation as:
NQ(A;B)p = sup
p(x,y)
inf
σ∈Σ(p(a,b|x,y))
∑
x,y
p(x, y)I(A;B|E)σ(x,y). (B1)
Let now p(a, b|x, y) be the correlation used in a DI protocol to distill key from a CHSH violation S
and error rate Q. Since p(a, b|x, y) can be obtained from the state ρ˜AB in (23) together with the
measurements given below (23), we have ρ˜AB ∈ Σ (p(a, b|x, y)). Hence, for a fixed distribution p(x, y),
inf
σ∈Σ(p(a,b|x,y))
∑
x,y
p(x, y)I(A;B|E)σ(x,y) ≤
∑
x,y
p(x, y)I(A;B|E)ρ˜(x,y), (B2)
where ρ˜x,yABE is obtained from measuring the state in (26). For S
>∼ 2.59 and xˆ, yˆ as defined above (27),
we have
I(A;B|E)ρ˜(xˆ,yˆ) ≥ I(A;B|E)ρ˜(x,y) for all x, y. (B3)
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FIG. 3: Comparison of upper bounds on the quantum intrinsic non-locality NQ(A,B)p defined in
Def. 8, where p(a, b|x, y) is the correlation obtained from the CHSH game. Our upper bound (B4) on
NQ(A,B)p is plotted in purple/triangles, and the upper bound on N
Q(A,B)p from [16] is plotted in
light blue/diamonds. The device-independent key rate evaluated in [13] is plotted in red/circles.
For 2 ≤ S <∼ 2.59 the maximal conditional mutual information of ρ˜x,yABE is achieved by the measurements
(x, y) = (1, 1). Thus, using (B1) and (B2), we get the following upper bound on the quantum intrinsic
non-locality:
NQ(A,B)p ≤ sup
p(x,y)
∑
x,y
p(x, y)I(A;B|E)ρ˜(x,y) =
{
I(A;B|E)ρ˜(xˆ,yˆ) for S >∼ 2.59,
I(A;B|E)ρ˜(1,1) for 2 ≤ S <∼ 2.59.
(B4)
In Fig. 3 we compare this bound on NQ(A,B)p to the one derived in [16]; evidently, for S >∼ 2.2 the
bound in (B4) is tighter.
